The Tragedy of Russia's Reforms: Market Bolshevism Against Democracy

By Peter Reddaway and Dmitri Glinski

Book Overview

The Tragedy of Russia s Reforms presents a boldly original analysis of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the birth of the Russian state. The keys to understanding these events, the authors argue,... This description may be from another edition of this product.

• Format: Paperback
• Language: English
• ISBN: 1929223064
• ISBN13: 9781929223060
• Release Date: January 2001
• Publisher: United States Institute of Peace Press
• Length: 745 Pages
• Weight: 2.70 lbs.
• Dimensions: 1.6" x 6.1" x 8.9"

Customer Reviews

German-language review

Peter Reddaway (George Washington University Washington, DC) und Dmitri Glinski (Institut für Weltwirtschaft und internationale Beziehungen Moskau) legen mit dieser voluminösen Studie der postsowjetischen russischen Reformversuche nicht nur die bisher bei weitem fundierteste Kritik des Reformkurses der Jelzin-Regierung vor. Sie steuern mit diesem Buch auch eine besonders detaillierte, fakten- und quellengesättigte Beschreibung der turbulenten Ereignisse im Rußland der 1990er sowie eine umfassende Interpretation dieses Jahrzehnts im Kontext der gesamten russischen Geschichte bei. Dieses Buch scheint dafür prädestiniert zu sein, sich zu einem Standardwerk zu Jelzins Herrschaft zu entwickeln. Aufgrund der Vielzahl der Ereignisse, Tendenzen, Theorien und Konzepte, die Reddaway und Glinski hier vorstellen, werden Rezensenten ganz verschiedene Aspekte erwähnenswert finden. Reddaways und Glinskis Konzipierung und Verwendung des Bolschewismusbegriffs ist in diesem Zusammenhang durchaus einer ernsthaften Beachtung wert. Besteht - trotz aller offensichtlichen ideologischen Gegensätze zwischen den Bolschewiki des beginnenden und radikalen Reformern des ausgehenden 20. Jahrhunderts - womöglich tatsächlich eine strukturelle Ähnlichkeit im Gesellschaftsbild, Selbstverständnis und der Transformationsstrategie beider Gruppierungen? Viele Beobachter - so auch dieser - würden eine derartige Gleichstellung zunächst ablehnen. Nach der Lektüre des Buches stellt sich jedoch die Sinnhaftigkeit eines Vergleichs beider Strömungen nicht mehr als so abwegig dar (wenn auch eine pauschale Gleichstellung weiterhin ungerechtfertigt erscheint). Zumindest ist festzustellen, daß die Ereignisse der 1990er als eine Revolution und die "Reformer" als Revolutionäre zu betrachten sind. Auch läßt sich eine gewisse Arroganz im öffentlichen Auftreten solcher Männer wie Anatolij Cubais, Boris Fëdorov oder Egor Gajdar sowie der dubiose, ja destruktive Charakter bestimmter "Reformschritte", insbesondere der Privatisierung einiger Filetstücke der russischen Industrie nach dem "Kredite für Aktien"-Schema, nicht bestreiten. Zudem können einige Figuren im Lager der "Reformer", wie etwa der berüchtigte, später als Stabschef der Union Rechter Kräfte fungierende Alfred Koch, wohl kaum als wirkliche Demokraten bezeichnet werden. Ebenso erscheinen die teilweise ambivalenten Stellungnahmen einiger als "Westler" geltender Politiker zum Tschetschenienabenteuer des konservativen Teils der Jelzinadministration als alarmierend. Nicht zuletzt machen Reddaway und Glinski zu Recht darauf aufmerksam, daß das Verhältnis zwischen freier Marktwirtschaft und Demokratie keineswegs so eineindeutig ist, wie es viele russische "Refomer" sowie einige westliche Kommentatoren den einfachen Russen glauben machen wollten. Ob dies und einige weitere Aspekte der Reformversuche der 1990er ausreichend sind, um von einem "Marktbolschewismus" der "Reformer" der verschiedenen Jelzinregierungen zu sprechen, wird der Leser für sic

A well-balanced inquiry into the complexities of Russia

By applying structural methodology, the authors have in this book managed to disentangle and address a plethora of important issues attached to the transitional phase of the Russian modernisation. The principal claim of shock therapy being an outcome of the "democracy-capitalism" dichotomy is plausibly supported and illuminated by evidence proving the unsuitably pervasive influence of external institutions such as the IMF, coupled with presidential authoritarianism. The analysis accumulates considerable propensity and dynamic when the authors address the Western `ready made, assumptions of social phenomena such as nationalism, democracy and populist movements. It delivers an insight of the intricacies inherent in the social structure. Although the authors attempt to remain largely impartial and empirical in their study, the reader cannot fail to get the feeling that the line of arguments, at times, is too one-dimensioned towards Yeltsin and the IMF. It would add more substance to the study, had the authors incorporated a wider discussion of the international dimension. I do largely agree with the author's criticism towards Yeltsin when they argue that the presidential institution enjoyed the decree to choose a more suitable path to economic modernisation. Moreover, I concur that there was a link between Yeltsin's domestic powers and the unconditional international support he enjoyed. This is not to say that external moods could or ought to have played a decisive role in shaping the future of Russia, but it should no doubt, in hindsight, have favoured the emergence of a civil society before the market. The authors have throughout the book pointed out several missed opportunities for a genuine democratic movement to take root. With Yeltsin out of the political circus, it remains to be seen if Putin will eventually allow the democratic forces in Russia, to infiltrate the socio-political layers and by so doing; put an end to another protracted and pernicious era in Russian history. I highly recommend this book for those who wish to understand Russia's place in today's and tomorrows economically globalised world.

Read the book Anders Aslund tried to smear!

Yes, it's right, Anders Aslund, former advisor to the Russian Government under Yeltsin, took quotes out of context from Reddaway and Glinski's book in a futile attempt to paint Reddaway, perhaps the most prominent authority in the world on the Soviet dissident movement and the abuse of psychiatric hospitals under the Soviet regime, and Glinski, a prominent figure in the democratic movement in Russia, as fascists...in any case, this book is by far the best that has been written telling the truth of Boris Yeltsin's tragic turn to the right -- to the mafiya and to old figures in the Soviet nomenklatura, and the accompanying turn away from the democratic movement which brought him to power.This book is a must-read for anyone who wants to go beyond the pronouncements of the American foreign policy establishment that Russia is on the road to democracy and learn what really happened.

Well-Written, Meticulously Researched, Outstanding Book

This is the book for anyone with a sense of placement (or the struggling lack thereof) and a taste for living history, but it's also a mandatory text for the market economists who predicted in 1990 that the former Soviet Union would be once again on top of the world by the 21st century, economically speaking. After all, many argued, they had 80 years to sit by and scrutinize, study, and learn from the mistakes of the other capitalist states that bumped, lurched, and stumbled along. But, as Heller once wrote, "something happened along the way..."The book opens up with a brief history of the Russian (then Soviet, then Russian again) people; their track record of reform and reaction. The next chapters explore theories behind pure capitalism versus pure democracy; presidents versus parliaments; dependency and co-existence throughout the entire planet; the many forms of nationalism throughout the expanding Russian national consciousness; and finally, the often painful consequences of economic globalization.Further, we begin to explore what would become the collapse of the Soviet Union; Gorbachev's attempts at reformation and his apparent "capitalistic" frame of mind (to the chagrin of his CPSU handlers, from whom these leanings had been well-hidden, and for good reason). The true heart of the book, however, opens with Yeltsin's "economic revolution" in 1991 (or '92, depending on where you lived). The economic revolution, the authors feel, helped stave off what would have certainly been a political revolution for purer democracy - the nomenklatura had yet to provide any real reforms other than the opening and immediate snapping shut of the window on democracy that was Glasnost. Unfortunately, Yeltsin's political and economic advisers had their sights set on higher aims, and weren't necessarily providing the soundest of information. Further, it would appear that they felt Boris was nothing more than a stepping stone, that the global public would soon tire of his drunken shenanigans, and would have him disposed of far more easily (and quickly, and permanently) than his predecessor.The cultural and moral decay brought about by Yeltsin's attempts at moving cabinet members around like pawns on a chess board are spelled out vividly. The authors feel, however, that the situation is not beyond hope, and present evidence to support this claim. The reader should approach this book not as a sympathetic driver cruising along the highway, slowing down just enough to cast a furtive glance at a crash victim, then to speed up and leave the accident scene in the rear-view mirror. There comes a time when the driver should pull over and offer what assistance can be provided, no matter what the immediate cost. The rewards (whether spiritual, moral, or financial - that's up to the driver to decide) will be monumental.