The Desert Fox In Normandy: Rommel's Defense Of Fortress Europe

By Samuel W. Mitcham Jr.

Book Overview

Perhaps the most famous and admired soldier to fight in World War II was Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, who achieved immortality as the Desert Fox. Rommel's first field command during the war was the 7th Panzer Division-also known as the Ghost Division-which he led in France in 1940. During this campaign, the 7th Panzer suffered more casualties than any other division in the German Army. During the process, it inflicted a disporoportionate amount of casualties upon the enemy. It took 97,486 prisoners, captured 458 tanks and armored vehicles, 277 field guns, 64 anti-tank guns and 4,000 to 5,000 trucks. It captured or destroyed hundreds of tons of other military equipment, shot down 52 aircraft, destroyed 15 more aircraft on the ground, and captured 12 additional planes. It destroyed the French 1st Armored Division and the 4th North African Division, punched through the Maginot Line extension near sSivry, and checked the largest Allied counteroffensive of the campaign at Arras. When France surrendered, the Ghost Division was within 200 miles of the Spanish border. No doubt about it-Rommel had proven himself a great military leader who was capable of greater things. His next command, in fact, would be the Afrika Korps, where the legend of the Desert Fox was born.

Rommel had a great deal of help in France-and much more than his published papers suggest. His staff officers and company, battalion and regimental commanders were an extremely capable collection of military leaders, which included 12 future generals (two of them SS), and two colonels who briefly commanded panzer divisions but never reached general rank. They also included Colonel Erich von Unger, who would no doubt have become a general had he not been killed in action while commanding a motorized rifle brigade on the Eastern Front in 1941, as well as Kark Hanke, a Nazi gauleiter who later succeeded Heinrich Himmler as the last Reichsfuehrer-SS. No historian has ever recognized the talented cast of characters who supported the Desert Fox in 1940. No one has ever attempted to tell their stories. This book remedies this deficiency.

In the weeks prior to D-Day, Rommel analyzed Allied bombing patterns and concluded that they were trying to make Normandy a strategic island in order to isolate the battlefield. Rommel also noticed that the Allies had mined the entire Channel coast, while the naval approaches to Normandy were clear. Realizing that Normandy would be the likely site of the invasion, he replaced the poorly-equipped 716th Infantry Division with the battle-hardened 352nd Infantry Division on the coastal sector. But his request for additional troops was denied by Hitler. Mitcham offers a remarkable theory of why Allied intelligence failed to learn of this critical troop movement, and why they were not prepared for the heavier resistance they met on Omaha Beach. He uses a number of little-known primary sources which contradict previously published accounts of Rommel, his officers, and the last days of the Third Reich. These sources provide amazing insight into the invasion of Normandy from the German point of view. They include German personnel records, unpublished papers, and the manuscripts of top German officers like general of Panzer Troops Baron Leo Geys von Schweppenburg, the commander of Panzer Group West. This book also contains a thorough examination of the virtually ignored battles of the Luftwaffe in France in 1944.

• Format: Hardcover
• Language: English
• ISBN: 0275954846
• ISBN13: 9780275954840
• Release Date: May 1997
• Publisher: Praeger
• Length: 256 Pages
• Weight: 1.17 lbs.
• Dimensions: 1.0" x 6.4" x 9.5"

Customer Reviews

The Desert Fox in Normandy

Anybody who has read a Mitcham book knows the author has high esteem for German Command and the Wehrmacht in general. One also knows that from 1944, he over stresses the poor state of the Wehrmacht and as such was fighting a big disadvantage. This book will be no exception for as the author describes how Rommel tried to exert a positive influence on his command in Normandy, he will also stress how understrength and inexperienced his divisions were. The author also goes into detail on how Rundstedt and Hitler refused Rommel's requests to redeploy his forces closer to the shore and specifically Normandy beaches. Rommel was convinced that the only way to defeat the Allied invasion was to push them back into the sea within the first few days when the Allies would be at their weakest. To accomplish this the panzer divisions would have to be nearer the shore. A problem with this theory is that neither Rommel or the author explains how the panzers would be protected from Allied air strikes. After the deliberate situational coverage prior to the landinggs, the author delivers a brief but decent summary of the engagements up to the end of July that will include Operation Cobra. Attempts at holding the beach, St Lo and the defense in the Caen sector are also covered in typical Mitcham fashion. The near fatal wounding of Rommel on July 17th and his subsequent recovery is discussed as well as his slight involvement in the plot to assassinate Hitler. The book ends in an attempt to save his family, Rommel commits suicide for the alleged involvment in the assassination attempt. There are a few maps and some good photos to study as well. The author, as usual, also provides an extensive Notes section. I take issue on three minor statements the author has made. The author states the Germans had 2000 panzers destroyed at Kursk. I believe that's an over statement. He also claims Japan was a good Ally of Germany which is false. The repeated misspelling of Adm Canaris's name was also disappointing. For anybody not familiar with Rommel this book would be a good starter book. Its not comprehensive but it is engaging and an easy read. It provides Rommel's insight and drive as a career officier and it shows a glimpse into Rommel's personal life. Anybody who is well read on WWII will probably not find anything new on Rommel in this book but its still worth having in your collection if your're a Rommel fan.

Interesting, informative -- worth the read

Author Mitcham does the American reader a service in covering Rommel's actions in Normandy and his writing is well-paced and readable. The book's strengths are in its viewpoint -- clearly outlining the hopelessness of the German defense as constrained by Hitler's interference and decisions against which Rommel labored much like a classical tragic hero, repeatedly avoiding defeat in very near-run situations, but unable to bring about victory. The comparative strengths of the Allies and Germans is discussed at length, and with the overwhelming tactical air support enjoyed by the Allies it is difficult to see how a lesser man than Rommel would have avoided a catastrophy long before the St. Lo breakout. On the Allied side, Bradley is presented as methodical and Montgomery as somewhat inept (without explaining Montgomery's desire to avoid incurring British casualties). The mini-biographies of German personnel are welcome (in the end notes), but sometimes multiple notes must be read before the individual comes into focus (like von Stuelpnagel.) On the negative side are the many inaccuracies -- I found myself reading with a pencil and correcting errors in the text (Bastone should be Bastogne, etc.) Curiously, the author usually refers to Wilhelm Canaris as "Canasis", even referencing Heinz Hoehne's book "Canaris" as "Canasis." In addition, books like this usually have inadequate maps, and this one is no exception. The author frequently gets his directions wrong such as where east should be west or northwest should be northeast, making the need for maps even more critical than usual. With respect to the Introduction complained about by an earlier reviewer, I found it accurate. Mitcham's point is that leaders do make historical impacts and that accurate biographies (of DWMs or whatever) are important in understanding history. That we are currently being very poorly served by elitist leftist academicians who revise history according to their own agendas is without doubt -- but rarely expressed. On any scale, Rommel was a German hero, ready to sacrifice himself for Germany and its people. I wonder how many university professors who have never been outside the cocoon of academia would be be willing to sacrifice anything, much less their lives, for their country. Certainly, the activities of academicians in World War II and subsequent conflicts would indicate something much less than a heroic sacrifice. Mitcham's book is refreshing, focusing on Rommel's struggles as an individual -- one who was immensely talented as a leader but frequently limited in his ability to accomplish what he saw as required in a doomed defensive conflict.