Repeated Games and Reputations C

by Larry Samuelson and George J. Mailath

Personalized and continuing relationships play a central role in any society. Economists have built upon the theories of repeated games and reputations to make important advances in understanding such relationships. Repeated Games and Reputations begins with a careful development of the fundamental concepts in these theories, including the notions of a repeated game, strategy, and equilibrium. Mailath and Samuelson then present the classic folk theorem...

• Format: Hardcover
• Language: English
• ISBN: 0195300793
• ISBN13: 9780195300796
• Release Date: September 2006
• Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
• Length: 672 Pages
• Weight: 2.85 lbs.
• Dimensions: 1.4" x 7.1" x 10.1"