Losing the Golden Hour: An Insider's View of Iraq's Reconstruction

by James Stephenson and Richard L. Armitage

Book Overview

In emergency medicine, "the golden hour" is the first hour after injury during which treatment greatly increases survivability. In post-conflict transition terminology, it is the first year after hostilities end. Without steadily improving conditions then, popular support declines and chances for economic, political, and social transformation begin to evaporate. James Stephenson believes we have lost Iraq's golden hour. A veteran of postconflict reconstruction...

• Format: Hardcover
• Language: English
• ISBN: 1597971510
• ISBN13: 9781597971515
• Release Date: October 2007
• Publisher: Potomac Books
• Length: 224 Pages
• Weight: 1.00 lbs.
• Dimensions: 0.8" x 6.4" x 9.1"

Customer Reviews

Unusual Primary Source on Stabilization & Reconstruction

I heard the author speak at the Army War College Strategy Conference organized by the Strategic Studies Institute (8-10 April 2008) and was so impressed I ordered his book on the spot. As a person, this man strikes me as supremely professional, competent, worldly, down-to-earth, and above all, without ego. This is a courageous individual that has specialized--only a handful can say this--in delivering aid into combat environments. The book is relatively short--under 150 pages--well written and easy to read. Here are the highlights from my flyleaf notes: 1) 28 years experience in stabilization & reconstruction, seven failed states behind him that he tried to help 2) Foreword of the book is by Rich Armitage, a former Navy Seal that I have found to be a speaker of truth to power (one reason why the Bush Administration hated him) 3) Pentagon (Rumsfeld) blew it Part I. They closed the Department of State and the Agency for International Development (AID) out during the critical year before and year after the elective invasion and occupation of Iraq. 4) Pentagon (Rumsfeld) blew it Part II. They created a Pentagon version of AID run by a General that had no clue about the more nuanced community based assistance program, who blew his whole wad on heavy duty infrastructure projects instead of the community water, electricity, food, and sewage treatment and health security needed. 5) Pentagon (Rumsfeld) blew it Part III. Instead of embracing skilled experts from AID and elsewhere, the Pentagon staffed their program office with ideologically-pure puppies, enfants terrible whose only qualification was a resume at the Heritage Foundation and the ability to chant the mantra, "God Blesses Dick Cheney, Dick Cheney IS God." MOST IMPRESSIVE to me was the author's elegant discussion of how stabilization must be secured BEFORE reconstruction can begin. The author points out that at 18 billion and up this was the largest RECONSTRUCTION project since the Marshall Plan (explicit throughout the book is the fact that the US Army, handicapped by Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz, never, ever, achieved sztabilization. The author is kind to Wolfowitz. In his words, Wolfowitz was a decent man who fell sway to the "swan song" of Chalabi and the other knaves representing Iran and one slice of the Iraqi exiles. The author is also careful to point out that he saw no villany, only incompetence and hubris, during his time in Iraq. [There is a superb recent memo, look for it at Earth Intelligence Network, on the utter incompetence of Foreign Service Officers and Pentagon "temp hires" to manage any kind of program. Early on we learn that the Pentagon's program office for Iraq is totally dysfunctional, mockingly called the "Jonestown" of Iraq (where everyone drank the poisoned kool-aid). The author slams Paul Bremmer as a good man who paid his dues in traditional diplomacy and had absolutely no clue how to manage an occupation presence. The author is careful to note that

Losing the Golden Hour

This short work covers the USAID effort in post-invasion Iraq from the author's perspective during his tour of duty Feb 2004- March 2005. Having served in Jordan and Iraq at the same period (Nov. 2003-Nov 2004 in Jordan; Dec. 2004-May 2006 in Iraq) as a contractor for a Department of State civilian police development program, I can vouch for much of the author's description of the disorganization and lack of planning effort that occurred during the first 18-24 months post-invasion. The fact was-- there was no post-war occupation or redevelopment plan. Nearly every post-war planning decision was made on the run and without much thought to the long-term consequences. During the preparation for the invasion, SecDef Rumsfeld prohibited any post-war planning and threatened his military advisors with termination of career if the subject was brought up; likewise, CENTCOM CINC Tommy Franks either refused to plan or simply did not have the foresight to plan post-war Iraq. Thomas Rick's book Fiasco covers that aspect very well and in greater detail than does this work, although both publications address the core issue of lack of foresight at the NSC level and lack of planning at the DoD level. One issue that does not get sufficient attention to the deficient post-war effort is significant impact of NSPD 36, a two page document signed by the President, that gave full and complete post-war authority to the DoD in all aspects of post-war development. NSPD-36 was obviously a power-grab by Vice President Cheney and SecDef Rumsfeld to exclude the "civilian" agencies such as USAID and Department of State from bringing their experts into the mission- it worked. In my experience, most of the regular military officers I worked with over the course of 2 and 1/2 years in the mission gave 100% effort in trying to overcome the deficient planning and fix the problem, even though most were way "outside" their expertise in trying to run an essentially civilian mission. The military reservists, particularly those called to active duty through the IRR, were often more of a hinderance and were generally incompetent and incapable of dealing with large-scale planning and redevelopment issues. The State Department by and large refused to serve in Iraq. The higher level officials of the State Department had generally refused to support the invasion and this anti-war/anti-Bush/anti-DoD antipathy continued for years. Unlike the armed forces where orders were issued to report to a particular duty station, service in Iraq for DoS officials was voluntary. The end result was second and third rate DoS officials, often less qualifed professionally than the military personnel, making a stab at running a national level program. Many DoS positions remained vacant the entire eighteen months I worked in Iraq- no career DoS personnel would volunteer to serve and the Secretary of State would not order mandatory service. And the few that did show up weren't particularly capable or compete

Should Be Studied Not Just Read

When I got my MA on US History I had a special class that studied WWII post-war in Europe. At some point in time universities will offer courses on post-war Iraq War. I think comparisons to the two events are valid, although quite different. Not just in the obvious outcome--Europe a success to a certain degree whereas Iraq is just a mess. It remains to be seen, in my view, if the Iraq War will be analyzed as a catastrophe or simply a disaster for America. Will it take ten years or fifty years for America to revover from this? Spike Stephenson notes that the title is derived from the medical term in which a patient will live or die based on the care he receives during the first hour after injury. Regarding rebuilding a country after a war or disaster, Spike notes there is essentially one year to get things straight. If not, the country will slide back into chaos or war for a variety of reasons, which Spike explains in detail. He also lets you know that he has been doing this for over twenty years, and that there is a tried and true system that works. He gives, in the beginning of the book, examples of those he worked with. What Spike provides are multiple examples of why the Iraq rebuilding failed. On page 20 he gives the money quote regarding Paul Bremer, ..."for accepting their counsel [the incompetents hired by the CPA], for the arrogance and hubris that seemingly emblodened him to continue on a course that was so obviously misguided, and for ignoring fifty years of US experience in post-conflict nation building." Page 42 is really why we get in these messes. Yes Rumsfeld was an ass and arrogant and always treated his subordinates like garbage. Unfortunately, there were many like him sent to Iraq. I remember officers like this former former general he describes, people more interested is putting down staff and being contrary rather than getting the job done. The issue involved hardened small housing rather than trailers, which were bought overseas (contracting again through the connected). The general. more interested in being a jerk, brushed aside the arguments for small houses with refuge areas (they were now receiving mortars and rockets) with the comment "we'll go with the trailers." This, in case anybody forgot, was why we had fragging in Vietnam. Pages 67-70 seem to show how the fraud in contracting went through Bremer and the other politically connected. Spike is very cautious how he explains this as I think he should be. Page 159 gives a good story about another corrupt jerk, Ari Fleischers brother. I think if you want to know what goes on in the Bush cabinet you just need to look at the story on page 115-118. This regards the import of generators. Spike was hounded by Rice's people virtually every day, something he states he did not need, about when the generators would arrive. I think the reason for this is that in an administration like Bush's, the person who brings in "good news" gets the pat on the head, whereas the bearer of