The Last Assault, 1944: The Battle of the Bulge Re-Assessed

By Charles Whiting

Book Overview

It has generally been assumed by historians of the Second World War that the Americans were caught completely unawares by the last great German Offensive - the drive into the Ardenees in December, 1944, known as the Battle of the Bulge.

But were they in fact caught unawares? In this remarkable reappraisal of those hectic days which preceded the last Christmas of the War, Charles Whiting argues that the answer is very probably that they were not. Which immediately poses the question: 'if the Americans knew that the Germans were coming, why didn't they reinforce the troops on the weakly held Ardennes sector of the front line?' Why indeed

What is certain is that ever since the end if the Second World War the guardians of the files relating to the Battle of the Bulge in the United States have been most unwilling to permit any examination thereof - this is spite of the Freedom of Information Act. So the author raises yet another question: 'Was somebody trying to cover something up and if so why?'

On the basis of such information as he has been able to cull from those, as yet unsorted, files and on information provided by the numerous survivors of the battle with whom he has been in contact, Charles Whiting attempts to answer these questions, and in so doing suggests that, if and when all the information relating to the Battle of the Bulge is made available, a serious reappraisal of that brief but bloody campaign, in which thousands of young American soldiers lost their lives at a time when many regarded the war as virtually won, may be required.

• Format: Paperback
• Language: English
• ISBN: 1844152227
• ISBN13: 9781844152223
• Release Date: April 2005
• Publisher: Pen & Sword Military
• Length: 256 Pages
• Weight: 1.15 lbs.
• Dimensions: 0.8" x 5.1" x 7.8"

Customer Reviews

Ike as diabolical plotter

This reader usually finds source-footnotes to be boring and irrelevant, but when grave accusations are made against a major historical figure, their absence lowers the value of the allegations to little more than tabloid level. Whiting, described on the dust-jacket as "a prolific author of war fiction", finds the conventional interpretations of the Ardennes Offensive to be the products of conspiracies and coverups, and the considerable American losses to be the result of Eisenhower's "evil, ill-conceived" strategy to lure the Germans out of their Seigfried Line. How Ike was able to direct the maniacal generalship of Hitler is not explained. The author's account of the battle is interesting when it focuses on the experiences of the ill-fated U.S. 28th and 106th Divisions, but it cannot be accepted as serious military history. (The rating stars are a requirement of the site and are disavowed. This reviewer dos not "rate" books.)

Conspiracy Theories in the Ardennes

Charles Whiting prefaces his work with his prior belief that all the secretes of World War II had been discovered. With the official release of some previously classified documents, including ULTRA decriptions and other sources the very existence of which had been denied until recently, Whiting found what he believes to be a previously undiscovered secret: SHAEF knew about the impending Ardennes Offensive. Not only did Eisenhower do nothing to prevent the assault, he welcomed it as a means of engaging the tattered remains of the Wermacht outside the nearly impenetrable fortifications of the West Wall.As with other conspiracy theories (Area 54, J.F. Kennedy, etc.), once the theory is fashioned, it is easy to find facts supporting it. However, many of Whiting's points are compelling. Although Eisenhower had little or no ULTRA intelligence about the offensive, MAGIC was intercepting and decoding an astounding number of messages from the Japanese ambassador which outlined the location and time of the assault. Furthermore, there is no question that Eisenhower's staff, notably Omar Bradley, had spoken about the advantages to a German assault in Belgium as early as October, 1944.Whiting's theory, naturally, is less than solid. For example, he fails satisfactorily to explain his opinions as to the reasons why Eisenhower's "plan" failed. Was it that Ike never expected the 106th to put up any resistance? Did he not foresee the German assault bottling up at St. Vith? Did he not realize the heroic defense of Bastogne would create headlines? Nevertheless, as any frequent reader of Whiting's writing can attest, his work is a compelling read. If the theory were advanced for critical review, far more detail and supporting documentation would be necessary. As it is, much of the book is devoted to historical narrative about the Ardennes Offensive -- itself interesting.