Game Theory

by Jean Tirole and Drew Fudenberg

Book Overview

This advanced text introduces the principles of noncooperative game theory in a direct and uncomplicated style that will acquaint students with the broad spectrum of the field while highlighting and explaining what they need to know at any given point.

This advanced text introduces the principles of noncooperative game theory--including strategic form games, Nash equilibria, subgame perfection, repeated games, and games of incomplete information--in...

• Format: Hardcover
• Language: English
• ISBN: 0262061414
• ISBN13: 9780262061414
• Release Date: August 1991
• Publisher: MIT Press
• Length: 604 Pages
• Weight: 3.25 lbs.
• Dimensions: 1.5" x 7.2" x 10.2"
• Age Range: 18 years and up
• Grade Range: Postsecondary and higher

Customer Reviews

An Essential Book

If you are going to do Micro at more than an undergraduate level, you are going to have this book on your shelf. It is quite comprehensive, although the notation is not always what one might be used to. I do share some of the misgivings voiced in other reviews -- topics sometimes don't appear in the order one might expect and the flow often may not seem natural. Also, the format of the presentation is unlike a mathematics text in that defibnitions, etc. may not always appear in nice blocks, etc. and occassionaly I have found myself wishing for a bit more technical detail, for example on Bayesian Games. But at some stage, if you do enough game theory, you will find yourself looking at it and then buying it.

An Essential Book

If you are going to do Micro at more than an undergraduate level, you are going to have this book on your shelf. It is quite comprehensive, although the notation is not always what one might be used to. I do share some of the misgivings voiced in other reviews -- topics sometimes don't appear in the order one might expect and the flow often may not seem natural. Also, the format of the presentation is unlike a mathematics text in that defibnitions, etc. may not always appear in nice blocks, etc. But at some stage, if you do enogh game theory, you will find yourself looking at it and then buying it.

Comprehensive and very well written

The theory of games is now pervasive in the fields of economics, financial modeling, logistics, operations research, network engineering, and population biology. As such a background in game theory is an absolute necessity if one is to deal with problems in these areas. This book is an advanced treatment of game theory, and presupposes the reader already has had some exposure to the subject. There is an excellent set of exercises at the end of each chapter, and so the book can be used as a textbook or for self-study. After an elementary example of a game in the introduction to motivate the subject, the authors begin in Part I of the book with the subject of static games with complete information. Strategic-form games are defined, along with dominated strategies, and the important concept of Nash equilibrium, the latter being introduced to deal with games that are not solvable by iterated strict dominance. For those with a background in elementary functional analysis, the authors prove that finite strategic-form game has a mixed-strategy equilibrium and prove that the Nash-Equilibrium has a closed graph. The concept of Nash equilibrium is extended to the concept of a correlated equilibrium, wherein each player can send another a private signal before they choose their strategy. In Part II, the authors discuss dynamic games with complete information. Examples of these kinds of games include a sequential version of the battle of the sexes game, and a sequential version of matching pennies. The authors discuss subgame-perfect equilibria, wherein an n-tuple of strategies constitute Nash equilibria in every subgame. The Stackelberg model of duopoly is discussed along with the repeated Prisoner"s dilemna, the latter being an example of backward induction in finitely repeated games. A kind of generalization of the principle of optimality in dynamic programming is used to analyze perfect public equilibria via a tool called self-generation. In Part III of the book, the authors discuss static games of incomplete information. Examples are discussed including Bayesian games, where at least one player is uncertain about another player"s payoff function, and first-price and second-price auctions. In first-price auctions, each player submits a sealed bid and the one with the highest bid obtains the item; in second-price auctions each player submits a sealed bid but the player submitting the highest bid gets to purchase the item for a cost given by the player with the second highest bid. The authors explain in detail the dominant strategies for these types of auctions. Bargaining with two-sided incomplete information is discussed and the optimal amount of trade is found from the linear equilibrium of the Chatterjee-Samuelson double action. In Part IV, dynamic games of incomplete information are discussed by the authors. Examples that they discuss include signaling games such as the two-period reputation game, and Spence"s education game. Signaling is widely used

Canonical game theory reference text

This is a definitive reference text. It is not a self-study course in game theory, nor even a useful introduction. It functions best as a brush-up source, or a reference on equilibrium refinements, for those who already know the basics, and can work with a fairly technical presentation. It's very good especially on screening games and Bayesian-type information games.For a more intuitive introduction to game theory, try a short little book by David Kreps called "Game Theory and Economic Modeling.".

A fine book on non-coop. Game Theory and Adverse Selection

If you are a Matematical Economist, and you like to study Game Theory or/and Adverse Selection, then this book is a must. It is wery precise when it comes to references, and it includes almost all significant contributions in the field. Sadley the book comes short on Moral Hazard, but that can be found elseware. Likewise if you look for Cooperative Game Theory, you wont find it here. The book is the best contribution I have found on Baysian topics