Body, Mind and Self in Hume's Critical Realism

By Fred Wilson

This essay proposes that Hume's non-substantialist bundle account of minds is basically correct. The concept of a person is not a metaphysical notion but a forensic one, that of a being who enters into the moral and normative relations of civil society. A person is a bundle but it is also a structured bundle. Hume's metaphysics of relations is argued must be replaced by a more adequate one such as that of Russell, but beyond that Hume's account is essentially correct. In particular it is argued that it is one's character that constitutes one's identity; and that sympathy and the passions of pride and humility are central in forming and maintaining one's character and one's identity as a person. But also central is one's body: a person is an embodied consciousness: the notion that one's body is essential to one's identity is defended at length. Various concepts of mind and consciousness are examined - for example, neutral monism and intentionality - and also the concept of privacy and our inferences to other minds.

• Format: Hardcover
• Language: English
• ISBN: 311032668X
• ISBN13: 9783110326680
• Release Date: February 2008
• Publisher: de Gruyter
• Length: 512 Pages
• Weight: 2.58 lbs.
• Dimensions: 1.6" x 6.0" x 9.0"
• Grade Range: Postsecondary